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A B S T R A C T   
Complex negotiations are done by people and are often carried out in pursuit of culturally ingrained ideas such as 
international unity or national sovereignty. As such, they may be subject to the sorts of adaptive biases and 
reasoning heuristics that are present at the level of individual or collective decision making. The following 
commentary applies an influential model of intuitive ethics, The Moral Foundations Theory, to the Brexit ne-
gotiations. This framework suggests that moral intuitions reflect five adaptive psychological systems shaped by 
our evolutionary history. Focusing on the three most relevant foundations of Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/ 
betrayal, Authority/subversion, I explore how both parties’ red lines and priorities are consistent with this 
criterion. In doing so, I hope to provide insight into how innate cognitive biases can inform legal processes with 
wide-ranging ramifications.   
1. Introduction 
On Christmas Eve, 2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson1 announced 
that the United Kingdom2 government and the European Union (EU) had 
agreed upon a free trade deal. An event, he claimed, resolved a question 
that had “bedeviled (British) politics for decades” (Guardian News, 
2020): the relationship between Britain and the EU.3 It has been a 
fraught alliance, historically characterized by skepticism and mistrust 
on the British side since they first joined the forebearer: the European 
Common Market (Carl et al., 2019). An ongoing push towards 
ever-greater political integration exposed the fault lines between a more 
isolationist Britain and the integrated EU. Tensions reached their zenith 
in 2016 when the UK electorate voted, by a small electoral majority, to 
leave the EU. Since the union’s creation, following the 1992 signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty, they are the first country to do so. 
That agreement, and the indivisibility of the four freedoms (goods, 
capital, services, and labor), legally guaranteed to member states since 
1986, marked a move towards a centralized European power. The 
expansion of which has been consistently opposed by conservatives in 
the UK (Lynch & Whitaker, 2013). As the second half of the twentieth 
century marked the birth of a united European continent, it also saw the 
decline of Britain’s Empire: an aspect of the nation’s history many of the 
public, predominantly English voters, are still proud of (Smith, 2019). 
(Smith, 2020) During this period, a once-dominant force that had 
invaded all but 22 of the recognized countries in the international 
community (at time of writing for Laycock, 2012) and controlled a 
quarter of the world incrementally surrendered or gave up the vast 
majority of its foreign territories. 
Because of this contrast, some researchers have interpreted British 
Euroscepticism through a postcolonial lens (Bachmann & Sidaway, 
2016; Dorling, 2019; Manners, 2018; Weale, 2016). They suggest the 
seismic shift in power relations has left much of the British public with a 
melancholic revanchism (Menon & Wager, 2019; Valluvan & Kalra, 
2019). Seeing the EU gain the global economic privileges and 
pre-eminence the UK once enjoyed may partially explain the reluctance 
of successive UK governments and large swathes of its population to 
E-mail address: d.smith47@rgu.ac.uk.   
1 Before entering politics, and going on to become Mayor of London in 2008, Foreign Secretary in 2016 and later Prime Minister in 2019, Boris Johnson had a 
successful career in journalism. During which he became known for sensationalist stories about EU bureaucracy, which made him popular among the public and 
Conservative politicians alike. For example, his former friend and colleague Peter Oborne (2021) recalls him fabricating that the EU wanted to standardise condom 
sizes because Italians have small penises. The decision was about safety vs. size, and carried out by The European Committee of Standardization, which is not a part of 
the EU. Oborne suggests his rise was due to his “narcissism” (p 62) and “superstar” charisma (p 137).  
2 For accessibility, I will be using the terms United Kingdom and Great Britain synonymously. However, I am utilising the definition of the former, meaning both 
are used to refer to the union comprising England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  
3 For accessibility, the labels UK and EU will be used to refer to their respective negotiating teams, along with the various institutions that they represent. 
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accept customs unions and regulations. Particularly when its centralized 
machinations, bestowing policy-making powers to bureaucratic in-
stitutions, make it seem less accountable than the British state: an 
often-raised comparison during the campaign (Smith, 2019). From this 
perspective, the Brexit negotiation process represents a test of British 
identity and the imposition of a European one. 
The EU is a democratic internationalist institution built around a 
shared ideology of political integration and shared sovereignty (Etiubon 
& Ibietan, 2018; Weale, 2016). They have become increasingly open to 
differentiated integration over time, with the legal and political struc-
tures allowing for a more socioeconomically heterogeneous member-
ship. Holzinger and Tosun (2019) cite the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) as an example since some member states refused to join and the 
EU did not permit others. The authors note that other non-member states 
have unilaterally chosen to adapt their national laws or been induced by 
the EU to do so, such as Switzerland or countries in the European Eco-
nomic Area. Still, institutionally the EU’s core commitments emphasize 
consistently between the constituent members. Demonstrating this, 
Matthijs et al. (2019) show how the EU’s two flagship policy areas, 
namely the Single Market and the Eurozone, are more inflexible than 
other federal arrangements such as the United States of America. The 
EU’s philosophy of agreement underlies the gradual development of a 
single market and the principled standardization of trade, product reg-
ulations, and economic policy. 
The pooled sovereignty approach, in which each member state re-
duces its power in exchange for representation at an institutional level, 
necessitates unanimity and cooperation (Peterson, 1997). Although the 
narrative of the UK as an ‘awkward partner’ can sometimes be exag-
gerated (Daddow & Oliver, 2016), these values are antithetical to their 
ideals that include self-governance and independence. Concepts that are 
entrenched in the country’s neoliberal economic framework and 
culturally reinforced through a prevailing narrative of an outsider state 
prevented from being a truly global influence by an oppressive European 
superpower (Daddow, 2015; Smith, 2019). Consequently, the UK has 
been granted various allowances over the years in exchange for their 
continued participation. They have had the highest number of conces-
sions in the past of all states and had the most significant examples of 
special treatment (Duttle et al., 2017). These have included an opt-out 
from the single currency, not being a part of the Schengen Zone and 
an annual rebate of £4.9 billion, described by the European budget 
commissioner Günther Oettinger as “the mother of all rebates” (Delcker, 
2017). 
The tumultuous relations between the UK and EU represent deep 
geopolitical divisions. But they also signify fundamental psychological 
differences, including attitudes towards power and a sense of collective 
identity. I do not deny the significant socioeconomic considerations that 
will have informed the tactics taken by both sides – others have 
comprehensibly discussed them elsewhere. But I do suggest differences 
in mindset could have influenced the attitudes and behavior of the 
people doing the negotiations, on both sides, and the populations they 
would be accountable to afterward. In that respect, though the talks 
were primarily a political process, they were a personal one on some 
level. As Hughes (2019) outlines, British prosperity, and by extension 
Brexit, is a mindset. Thus, it is potentially helpful to consider biases and 
decision-making processes that may underlie them. 
1.1. The Moral Foundations Theory 
Though people often consider the implications of his research in 
terms of how a species’ physical traits have been subject to evolutionary 
change, Charles Darwin (1859) envisioned his work extending to the 
human mind. Natural selection, he argued, did not stop at the most 
complex organ: the brain. As such, the way that it operates should reflect 
nature’s criterion. He envisioned that, over time, his new foundation 
would extend to psychology. Through this evolutionary perspective, our 
decision-making mechanisms can be conceptualized as adaptations, 
attuned towards resolving ancestral selection pressures, i.e., those which 
limit survival or reproductive fitness (Buss, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 
2005). As a species with few natural defenses or physical advantages, 
humans potentially took up joint action for the mutual security benefits 
of having a community (Stevens & Hauser, 2004), e.g., strength in 
numbers or redistributing resources. Dawkins (2016) distinguishes be-
tween humans being naturally benevolent, which he does not believe 
they are, and being calibrated towards communal living to aid indi-
vidual fitness. However, codependent tribes could not thrive without a 
shared moral sense to enable their cooperation (Haidt, 2012). For 
example, they could not sustain themselves if antisocial acts had become 
commonplace. 
Psychologists have since sought to identify the kinds of moral codes 
that could have emerged as adaptations to survival challenges in 
ancestral times. Perhaps the most popular model of intuitive ethics is the 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), which several fields have adopted, 
including personality, decision-making, and political science (Graham 
et al., 2013). Developed by Haidt and Graham (2007), this multi-layered 
framework understands moral intuitions through nativism, cultural 
learning, intuitionism, and pluralism. At its core, the authors suggest our 
history as a tribal species has resulted in a reflexive reasoning style that 
stems from evolved psychological systems. 
These also represent dimensions different formal and informal 
groups can delineate themselves by, depending upon the narratives and 
constructs they establish around each. Haidt (2012) borrows Marcus’ 
(2004) metaphor of a book getting redrafted in real-time. Some chapters 
in this book may be subject to heavy revisions in a given context, and for 
others it may be light. But provided there is evidence of a moral sense 
organized in advance of the editing, and it appears to be universal, he 
suggests it can be considered innate. Following extensive reviews of 
psychology, anthropology, and philosophy, he and colleagues suggest 
people derive their moral sense from five canonical foundations which 
prepare us to learn values, norms, and behaviors: Care/harm, Fair-
ness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/-
degradation (for a review, see Graham et al., 2013). 
Members of a social species, such as humans, should invest in the 
welfare of group members. Care/harm is associated with protecting 
others, particularly at-risk parties. All mammals face the adaptive 
challenge of protecting offspring and potential allies for prolonged pe-
riods. The MFT predicts this drive manifests in emotions and virtues 
such as kindness, gentleness, compassion, and nurturance. Fairness/ 
cheating is similarly oriented towards welfare, though related to the 
evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism, i.e., when individuals make 
sacrifices in the expectation of similar treatment in the future. Loyalty/ 
betrayal stems from coalitions competing for finite resources. It results 
in preferential treatment to ingroup members, manifesting in patriotism 
or nationalism. Authority/subversion is about preserving the honor of 
the ingroup through conserving traditional institutions and structures 
that give it power. Lastly, purity/degradation relates to fears of physical 
or abstract contamination, i.e., conservative attitudes towards behavior 
deemed to be deviant or taboo. A foundation commonly manifested in 
religious beliefs and traditions. 
Iyer et al. (2012) proposed Liberty/oppression as a sixth foundation, 
based upon concerns about coercion and freedom. I do not include it 
here because, at present, it is still a candidate rather than a canonical 
Foundation (“MoralFoundations.org,” n.d.). However, given the rhet-
oric surrounding emancipation during the campaign and one side 
negotiating for the economic benefits of membership with reduced re-
sponsibilities, it is reasonable to expect this would be more relevant to 
the UK (Smith, 2019). 
The MFT argues that we see situations as ethical to the extent that 
they relate to these foundations. Each represents a means by which in-
dividuals negotiate conflicts between protecting their welfare against 
that of their groups or others, i.e., inter or intra-tribal conflict. To Haidt 
(2012), the tribal mindset is an indelible part of human nature and an 
innate desire to seek out allies underlies affective polarization and 
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identity politics today. Tribes can be defined locally or globally, ranging 
from different cultures within the same neighborhood to party politics, 
individual nations, or international organizations, depending upon the 
type of collective identity individuals align themselves to, i.e., are they 
drawbridge up or drawbridge down people (TED, 2016)? Where there 
are considerable differences in moral reasoning, we tend to see poor 
intergroup relations (Graham et al., 2013). In the example above, the 
UK’s nationalist vision of independent states is contrary to the EU’s 
internationalist visions of ever closer union towards a politically inte-
grated European continent. Even an awareness of alternative world-
views and moral norms can be seen as an existential threat, triggering 
retaliation against what the outgroup represents (Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 
2011). It is on this abstract, emotional level that questions relating to 
sovereignty make the most sense. As per Auer (2017), provided the state 
had the authority to withdraw its ascent, the EU could not compromise 
the sovereignty of Britain’s parliament: the paradox of the Brexit 
referendum. 
The model’s five-factor structure has been highly influential and, as 
suggested by tests of measurement invariance, universally stable 
(Doğruyol et al., 2019). It can, therefore, partially explain why people 
have ideological preferences or express different political identities. 
How individuals respond to MFT questionnaires predicts a vast amount 
of other attitudes including their political orientation (Turner-Zwinkels 
et al., 2020), how they think public restrooms should be segregated (Cox 
et al., 2021), cooperative vs. militant approaches to foreign policy 
(Kertzer et al., 2014) and, most relevant to this paper, how they voted in 
the Brexit referendum (Harper & Hogue, 2019). There are also consis-
tent patterns relating to political stances, with those on the left tending 
to prioritize care/harm and fairness/betrayal foundations, the individ-
ualizing foundations. In contrast, more conservative people place a 
higher value on the other three, known as the ‘binding’ foundations, 
which promote order and cohesion (Graham et al., 2009; Turn-
er-Zwinkels et al., 2020). 
The MFT argues that divergent approaches to socio-political topics 
lead to a range of reasoning styles. Between individuals or groups 
formed around particular values, different ways of seeing the world can 
cause an empathy gap. As Haidt (2012) says, reasonable people are 
easily divided by politics and religion because those on opposing sides 
do not feel the same way or have the same emotional responses to sit-
uations. As such, they do not always identify with each other’s in-
tuitions. Particular moral profiles appear to be relevant to the ideology 
guiding Leave, including the public mandate to carry it out along with 
the UK’s contemporary political norms (Harper & Hogue, 2019; Smith, 
2019). Likewise, distinct profiles may have contributed to the EU’s 
development and enabled it to function in relative harmony for decades. 
It is, therefore, reasonable to think that differences between UK and EU 
moral styles may have informed how the two of them conducted nego-
tiations in public or private. 
This is not to imply that the EU is a homogenous entity. Arguably, it 
is more politically diverse and heterogeneous than the UK since it 
comprises a larger coalition of nations with distinct historiographies, 
priorities, and values. Member states have been at war with each other 
far more recently than parts of the UK. They also have a greater disparity 
in the political ideologies they have previously adopted, with 11 mem-
ber states being post-communist countries. The EU practices both 
intergovernmentalism, where decisions follow widespread consensus 
and cooperation between member states, and supranationalism, where 
institutions independent of governments can prepare or make decisions 
(Schmidt, 2016; Preitz, 2018). So, while there exist significant differ-
ences between nations, it has been argued a common morality, which 
exists at an institutional vs. state level, recognizes and celebrates them 
(Eleftheriadis, 2011). Or, as their motto says, “united in diversity” (“The 
EU motto,” n.d.). This dedication towards reconciliation and democracy 
underpins the organization winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 (Le 
Cacheux & Laurent, 2014). 
1.2. The present article 
Smith (2019) wrote a commentary exploring the Brexit campaign 
from an MFT perspective. The present article provides a follow-up, 
looking at the negotiation process that followed, during which the UK 
and the EU would translate the relatively abstract concepts of Brexit and 
sovereignty into concrete legal agreements with far-reaching ramifica-
tions (Menon & Wager, 2020). As with Smith (2019), I do not imply that 
the MFT is integral to understanding Brexit negotiations. After all, no 
psychology model, no matter how intricate, can explain a prolonged 
geopolitical process involving socioeconomic realities, political consid-
erations, and the inputs of thousands of people engaging in conscious 
deliberation. When making significant political decisions, parties may 
also make decisions pragmatically rather than sticking rigorously to 
their principles, which it may be reasoned has happened with some 
compromises, including over the Northern Irish border. 
However, primarily negotiations are carried out by people, who are 
prone to bias, on behalf of different ingroups, who also are (Haidt, 
2012). Therefore, differences in values and moral styles should be pre-
sent in aims, concessions, and red lines raised. Politics is personal, and 
identification with ingroups can impact members emotionally (Evans & 
Schaffner, 2019). Since those carrying negotiations are not doing so 
from a position of political neutrality, then the social intuitionist MFT 
can give us insight into why representatives approached them as they 
did. Therefore, it can provide us with a means of understanding why the 
two organizations involved in Brexit chose the red-lines they did and 
why finding a compromise took four and a half years. 
In the following sections, I aim to explore the negotiation stance of 
both parties as a function of the Moral Foundations Theory. I concen-
trate upon three that are especially critical to this sort of negotiation: 
Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, and Authority/subversion. There is 
often substantial crossover, with issues that trigger one foundation 
applying to others, meaning their significance is not mutually exclusive 
(Haidt, 2012). For example, though I include debates about immigration 
in the section on Loyalty/betrayal, they are also relevant to Fair-
ness/cheating. I will also briefly reflect on the significance of the other 
two foundations: Care/harm and Sanctity/degradation. In doing so, I 
aim to explore how the representatives of each side’s apparent behavior 
and public statements suggest there may have been a difference in moral 
reasoning between the UK and EU negotiating teams. I also aim to show 
that the Moral Foundations Theory may help us better understand what 
happens when two political tribes, with different aims and values, 
negotiate legislation. 
2. The Brexit negotiations and the Moral Foundations Theory 
2.1. Fairness/cheating 
As social animals, humans likely encountered many opportunities to 
participate in exchanges to forge relationships (Trivers, 1971). A 
recurring selection pressure, that ought to have calibrated us to recog-
nize and respond to instances in which others are taking from a com-
munity without giving back. This foundation relates to intuitive 
concerns about unfair treatment and inequality so that individual 
members of a population can reap the benefits of two-way partnerships 
(Graham et al., 2013). Original triggers consist of cheating, cooperation, 
and deception, resulting in emotions such as anger, gratitude, and guilt 
that inform notions of justice, inequality, and reciprocation. Hyman 
(2014) argues these are inherent to mediated deal-making where parties 
negotiate competitively to meet their conflicting goals and desires. 
An example of the fairness foundation informing the negotiations 
was what became known as the Brexit “divorce bill”: Britain’s 
outstanding liabilities of £39 billion, calculated by the UK’s Office for 
Budget Responsibility, agreed before the referendum 
(Sánchez-Barrueco, 2018). This payment was an aspect of the with-
drawal bill negotiated before the trade deal, following the EU insisting 
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that the UK pay existing commitments as a matter of justice. In line with 
the EU’s redistributive approach towards conceptualizing fairness, the 
EU’s chief Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier4 originally stipulated that 
Britain should pay regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, saying 
delivering commitments for participation was a responsibility for all 
countries. Although he also played to the UK’s reluctance, hinting the 
debt could be the basis for a link between the initial withdrawal set-
tlement and the political/economic agreements to be made later (Fer-
guson, 2018). 
Barnier might have taken this accommodating tone because the EU 
Financial Affairs Lords sub-committee (2017) had given a precedent for 
not paying, claiming the UK was not bound to doing so if it were to leave 
the EU without an arrangement. In support, Dominic Raab5 (2018), then 
Brexit Secretary, wrote that Britain would not pay the terms of the 
financial settlement in the event of no deal. Likewise, Boris Johnson 
declared that there would not be any money owed in the absence of an 
agreement (Waugh, 2019). In both cases, they imply that the EU would 
be cheating the UK if they got it, portraying the financial settlement as 
Britain going beyond their obligations. Maybe this was a 
hard-negotiating tactic, which I will be returning to in the Author-
ity/subversion section – to make it appear the UK was doing a favor. 
Regardless, the final withdrawal agreement resulted in the UK agreeing 
to scheduled payments. It would not be easy to envisage a deal with 
good terms if they had not agreed to this. 
Throughout the Brexit campaign, the Leave side highlighted a trade 
deficit between the EU and the UK: that the EU exports more to the UK 
than the other way round (“Briefing: trade, investment and jobs will 
benefit if we Vote Leave,” n.d.). A discrepancy that may explain why 
pollsters YouGov found that, during the negotiation, more British voters 
thought that the EU needed the UK more than the other way round 
(Smith, 2017). In theory, new trade barriers put a more significant 
amount of exports at risk for the 27 countries in the EU than for the UK. 
Hence former Brexit Secretary David Davis6 European claiming car 
manufacturers would “be knocking down Chancellor Merkel’s door 
demanding that there be no barriers to German access to the British 
market” within minutes of a vote for Brexit (Walker, 2018). 
While it was true, at the time of Brexit, there was a trade surplus 
favoring the UK, the relative lack of kickback from EU companies may 
have been because it contributed to a considerably smaller portion of the 
remaining EU nations’ combined economy than Britain’s (Gasiorek 
et al., 2018). In the 12 months before September 2016, the trade surplus 
value was about £60 billion: UK imports were £302 billion worth of 
goods and services from the EU, vs. £242 billion worth of exports. Yet UK 
exports to EU countries were valued at approximately 13% of the 
economy vs. the 3–4% for the EU (Dhingra et al., 2017). The distinction 
came up when the then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson insulted Italian 
minister Carlo Calenda by insisting his country would lose sales of 
Prosecco wine. A claim that was met with the qualifier Italy would lose 
sales to one country while the UK lost “fish and chips” exports to 27 
(Mason et al., 2016). 
The critical point is that the UK representatives appeared to view the 
relationship through the lens of equity: an arrangement that would 
acknowledge their contribution. They pushed for an unfettered free 
trade deal without the perceived costs of trading with the EU: the free 
circulation of people and the same regulations. Something Michel Bar-
nier said the organization would “never, never, never” compromise on 
(Ellyatt, 2020) - which they did not. The EU side’s insistence the UK 
would receive the same treatment as other third countries, regardless of 
its input to date, exemplifies their commitment to interpretations of 
fairness, focusing on equality vs. proportionality (Graham et al., 2009). 
They must be subject to European Law and could not access the EU on a 
tariff and quota-free basis. In other words, to have free movements in 
goods, the then President of the European Council, Donald Tusk,7 stated 
that the UK must accept the other freedoms that all other states are 
bound to, including people’s free movement (Jensen & Kelstrup, 2019). 
In line with this commitment to unity, they sought a cohesive 
approach to negotiations – done with the cooperation of national gov-
ernments. Through a combination of subtle instrumental and overt po-
litical maneuvers, they created a withdrawal agreement all member 
states signed up to (Schuette, 2021). They are a collective body and so 
argued that individual contributions of constituent states could not 
provide the basis for preferential treatment. Data shows that citizens 
who internalize the EU’s identity see a responsibility to help members 
that contribute less, indicating they are willing to pay the price to pre-
serve this sense of equality (Verhaegen, 2018). A very different mindset 
from Britain focused on their contribution relative to other members, i. 
e., proportionality (Haidt, 2012). On a related note, following the 
collapse of some Eurozone economies (that is to say, countries which use 
the Euro), EU law required Britain to be compensated, immediately and 
in full, for any losses caused by the union bailing out a member who 
adopted that currency (Mason, 2015). An economic concession other 
member states agree to make. 
As the eventual deal grew closer, there was an increasing focus on 
preserving a level playing field between the UK and the EU. Trade policy 
would need to be standardized, resulting in common rules/practices to 
avoid businesses in one country gaining a competitive advantage over 
those in others. Typically, the European Court of Justice would enforce 
these. For the EU, the idea of an ex-member state extracting open access 
to the market while simultaneously being able to undercut their com-
mon high standards would be unfair (Kotsonis, 2020). This slant may 
also act as a strategic means of ensuring other countries, particularly 
recently ascended states, do not start to seek out concessions of their 
own from the EU obligations that they are less fond of (de Ruyter, 2020): 
a concern I will be returning to in the Authority/subversion section. For 
the EU, their priority was to protect members of the single market and 
control access to it. 
Of course, the consensual approach represents a problem since the 
Leave campaign Boris Johnson fronted was won with an emancipatory 
narrative, depicting the EU as a fundamentally corrupt body of un-
elected bureaucrats reigning Britain in with needless laws (Smith, 
2019). Ergo, allowing practices to be determined abroad to the advan-
tage of the remaining member states could compromise the fairness 
4 Michel Barnier was the chief negotiator for both the withdrawal agreement 
and the free trade deal. He had previously been appointed a special advsior for 
defence and security, by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, 
following his time as French Foreign Minister. During the European financial 
reforms, which he oversaw, he built a reputation as a mediator, able to find 
agreement between diverse parties with competing interests (Barker & Spiegel, 
2014).  
5 Dominic Raab was appointed Brexit Secretary in 2018, following the 
resignation of David Davis, and left the post later the same year after failing to 
negotiate a deal he could support. A dedicated Leaver, Raab had built a repu-
tation as a loyal minister who was also willing to take a strong stance against 
the EU in support of a “full fat Brexit”, such as previously calling his interloc-
utor Michel Barnier “unprofessional” (Drury & Buchan, 2018).  
6 David Davis served as Brexit Secretary between 2016 and 2018, resigning 
because he thought Theresa May’s withdrawal agreement gave away “too much 
and too easily” (Cooper, 2018). Since the 1990s he had habitually bridled plans 
to transfer powers to the EU. A self-described “charming bastard”, the former 
SAS reservist developed a reputation for machismo and enjoyed his nickname of 
“Monsieur Non” among EU members (Parker & Barker, 2018). 
7 Donald Tusk is a former Polish Prime Minister and served as President of the 
European Council between 2014 and 2019. He has frequently supported 
stronger political and economic integration within the continent. Hence, he 
famously said “we already miss you” on the day Theresa May triggered Article 
50 to begin the negotiation process, lamenting it as not a “happy day” (Stone, 
2017). As a crucial voice to the EU, it has been suggested he was integral to the 
decision to let the UK extend Article 50, rather than crashing out of the EU with 
no deal, and also the need for avoiding a hard border in Ireland (Craig, 2017). 
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foundation by limiting sovereignty. Aside from a level playing field 
potentially restricting Britain’s ability to pursue deregulation or trade 
with other less restricted partners, the UK public’s frustration with de-
cisions that impact them getting made elsewhere is no small part of why 
they backed Brexit. During her time as Prime Minister, Theresa’s May 
negotiated an ill-fated agreement committing the UK to EU rules on 
workers’ rights, safety standards, and the environment in exchange for 
unfettered trade. Boris Johnson quickly pledged to scrap it after taking 
office following her resignation (Rayner, 2020). 
The final deal saw a compromise both sides could reasonably claim 
as a victory. Between them, they negotiated an arrangement that would 
see the UK following EU rules for state aid and competition, though 
being able to set its standards on other areas within fixed parameters 
(Warrell, 2020). Should they deviate too far, then the EU could restrict 
access to the European market with tariffs. In effect, this means that they 
successfully negotiated protections that the UK agreed to follow, 
including areas such as environmental protection, transport, energy, and 
state aid. However, if these were too constraining, the UK could 
unilaterally withdraw from them later, and the European Court of Jus-
tice would have no jurisdiction. So, this deal is also in line with the UK 
achieving independence, as their continued cooperation is voluntary. To 
an extent, this was always true. As Auer (2017) points out, provided the 
UK had the authority to withdraw its ascent, which it did, then the EU 
never compromised the sovereignty of its parliament. Still, having this 
agreement offers a symbolic victory to both institutions. 
While the latter was initially reluctant to compromise, it is worth 
mentioning that both Theresa May and Boris Johnson had previously 
agreed to some level playing field provisions. In each case, they had 
decided Northern Ireland would need to comply with some single 
market rules to avoid regulatory checks on the border with the Republic 
of Ireland, which is in the EU (Stojanovic, 2020). I will be returning to 
this controversial aspect of the negotiation more in the next section. 
2.2. Loyalty/betrayal 
This foundation is considered an adaptive response to forming 
cohesive coalitions (Haidt, 2012). In-groups need to be able to respond 
to perceived threats or challenges. It is thought to be behind grouping 
emotions such as pride and distrust of outgroups, with relevant virtues 
being patriotism and loyalty. Viewed on an evolutionary timescale, only 
recently have individuals been able to make contact with members of 
different races or cultures on a day-to-day basis (Navarrete et al., 2010). 
Instead, we have spent most of our time within small wandering clans 
and isolated communities. Haidt (2012) and colleagues would suggest 
that a hang-over from this era may be an inherent preference for one’s 
ingroup, identity, and values foraged from shared historiography, nar-
ratives, and culture. 
Haidt (2016) suggests nationalists tend to view their ingroups, and 
by extension their culture, as unique, so pursue policies to preserve it 
against alternatives. This viewpoint is similar to Anderson (2006), who 
explored nationalism as a function of imagined communities. He sug-
gests customs and traditions enable people to establish commonality and 
group membership within the same population across generations. As 
the world has become increasingly globalized, nations represent an 
example of a socially constructed community of people who identify 
with each other. This identification could take different forms within the 
same communities, depending upon the aspects of a local culture and 
history people respond to. 
For some, UK identity might be based upon its labor movement or its 
colonial tradition. This matter is further complicated by the gradual 
succession of the UK into its constituent elements via nationally 
entrusted devolved parliaments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland. Post-nationalists, or cosmopolitans, may also feel little sense of 
national pride or nationalism (Heath & Tilley, 2005). However, a sense 
of “Englishness” built around the Empire’s achievements was a signifi-
cant predictor of people supporting Brexit (Henderson et al., 2017; 
Smith, 2019). Negative views of immigrants are also more common in 
Brexit vs. Remain favoring towns (Springford et al., 2016). 
With common consensus, culture, and a pro-federal political system, 
identity can transcend borders. Many interlinking regional identities can 
coexist multidimensionally with a common societal identity. For the EU, 
modernity, cosmopolitanism, and social justice may define its cultural 
and political identity (Delanty, 2004). In contrast to a nationalist UK 
identity, meaning a sense of national superiority and desire for domi-
nance, support for the EU correlates with the closely linked concept of 
patriotism, i.e., a sense of pride in one’s country (Huddy et al., 2021). 
Identification with an ingroup appears to have a powerful influence 
on people’s attitudes and feelings (Evans & Schaffner, 2019). While 
specifics vary both between and within cultures, depending upon the 
values of communities, evidence shows paraphernalia associated with 
nationhood can increase feelings of nationalism (Kemmelmeier & 
Winter 2008) and increase nationalists’ hostility towards outgroup 
members (Becker et al., 2011). In the UK context, prejudice against 
immigrants was a reliable predictor of people voting Leave but not 
Remain (Golec et al., 2019; Meleady et al., 2017). This pattern is not 
surprising since concerns about freedom of movement were among the 
main reasons people backed Brexit (Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin & 
Milazzo, 2017) and the Leave campaign’s most persistent topic (Swales, 
2016). Hence immigration would inevitably be a big part of the nego-
tiations to follow. 
As an ingroup, the EU values an apparent commonality and equality 
between citizens, with unrestricted travel being so fundamental to be 
one of the four freedoms. Thus, a country retaining economic unity in 
the absence of offering this freedom goes against their red lines. How-
ever, to not prioritize an end to freedom of movement would go against 
the UK’s. Preserving or stopping freedom of movement could be seen as 
a violation of ingroup loyalty (Haidt, 2012), albeit to different ingroups. 
Both Brexit Prime Ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson guar-
anteed an ending to unrestricted freedom of movement as a priority. But, 
as their predecessor David Cameron8 found out when trying to renego-
tiate the UK’s position in the EU before the referendum, a general 
opt-out is not something states could do while retaining free access to 
the European market (Weiss & Blockmans, 2016). The EU has become 
increasingly restrictive in the last decade, with freedom of movement 
typically subject to communitarian conditions at the national level 
rather than absolute. For example, there are restrictions for receiving 
residence permits or social assistance in many EU countries (Martinsen 
& Pons Rotger, 2014). Nevertheless, its legislative branches, the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Parliament, conceptualize the 
ability to move freely between countries as an individual right (Roos & 
Westerveen, 2020). The European Council is an exception, tending not 
to frame freedom of movement as a right unto itself, but pragmatically 
seeing mobility as an essential part of establishing a common EU labor 
market. Thus, the UK negotiators got the promised end to unrestricted 
immigration. By opting out of the four freedoms, though, the UK could 
no longer take on the Norwegian or Swiss models since each necessitates 
freedom of movement. Meaning they would have to fight to preserve the 
economic benefits and opportunities that come with membership. 
There were further complications involving immigration, such as the 
prospect of the UK repatriating 3 million EU citizens living in Britain. 
Despite the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee stating that EU 
citizens should not be bargaining chips in negotiations, clarifications 
were slow, with many worried about being deported following a newly 
8 David Cameron was UK Prime Minister between 2010 and 2016. As Con-
servative Party leader, he famously said they needed to stop “banging on about 
Europe” (Kettle, 2016). Ironically, it was losing the Brexit referendum that 
ended his career. It has been suggested that Cameron’s biggest flaw was being 
reactive, and putting out fires, rather than having a coherent plan. Hence the 
decision to hold an EU referendum being portrayed as an attempt to appease his 
own divided party than satisfying a public demand (Seldon & Snowdon, 2015). 
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introduced criminal check (Bulat, 2018; Henley, 2019). During the 
referendum campaign, the Brexit side had offered indefinite leave to 
remain to 3 million EU citizens already legally residents of the UK. 
However, in her capacity as Prime Minister, Theresa May said their right 
to settled status depended on the rights of 1 million UK citizens in 
Europe (Cowburn, 2016). A tit for tat arrangement consistent with 
proportionality interpretations of the fairness foundation, implying a 
threat should the EU not reciprocate the UK position. Unlike EU in-
stitutions, they did not see travel as a right per se but a deal component. 
Both sides later agreed to guarantees, but this attitude may be one part 
of why emigration from the UK among EU citizens increased substan-
tially during the negotiation period (Lomax, 2019). 
On a related point, the then French economic affairs minister 
Emmanuel Macron suggested his government would pull out of the Le 
Touquet agreement if Brexit went ahead (Henley, 2016). This agreement 
is a bilateral arrangement that places part of Britain’s border with 
France in the port town of Calais. Since a likely consequence of France 
opting out would be reduced border security on their side, Macron used 
the prospect of more refugees as a tactic to put people in Britain off 
Brexit. Another way of appealing to the Loyalty foundation, but this time 
through a warning. Potentially, he was triggering the Care/harm foun-
dation too. In the months before the Brexit referendum, the Leave side 
campaigned on the perceived risk of Angela Merkel’s decision to allow 
undocumented refugees into Europe, facilitating the movement of ter-
rorists (Abbas, 2019; Smith, 2019). 
A tactic in step with the “could be terrorists” schema in the European 
discourse surrounding Muslims (Goldberg, 2006). The conflation be-
tween refugees and terror suspects is based on the fear that a lack of 
systematic checks in the EU Schengen Zone could offer an unperturbed 
passage to the English Channel. In that respect, the French government 
was priming the possibility that a divisive Brexit would leave the UK 
vulnerable to terror. I will return to this theme in the section about other 
moral concerns. However, once again, we see an example of an outgroup 
used as leverage. These threats did not amount to anything and were 
likely more posturing in a way that treated people in outgroups as 
pawns. 
A more sustained concern relating to border control focused on the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. If the UK were to leave the 
Customs Union, as planned, then theoretically, a barrier would need to 
rematerialize on the island of Ireland to check goods going between 
countries. On a practical level, new infrastructure would present a major 
hindrance to unfettered trade. However, more importantly, it would risk 
inflaming tensions between communities (Durrant & Stojanovic, 2018). 
The island of Ireland is split between a republic south with 26 counties, 
which is in the EU, and six northern counties ruled from Westminster 
and a devolved parliament in Belfast. 
There is not space to give a comprehensive explanation as to the 
nature of the British and Irish relations. But at its most basic, tensions in 
Northern Ireland come from a struggle between parties that intend to 
reunite the island and others that want to keep the six counties as part of 
the UK. Ongoing tensions in the north revolve around numerous socie-
tal, religious, political, economic, and psychological factors (Cairns & 
Darby, 1998). Therefore, the resultant Troubles are deeply rooted in the 
Loyalty foundation suggested by Haidt (2012), stemming from ingroup 
within a common region, delineated by loyalty to historically opposed 
institutions. The concern was that a border separating parts of Ireland, 
or separating Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK, could lead to 
political unrest. Possibly even reigniting the violence in Northern 
Ireland that had lasted decades. 
One solution was the Irish backstop: something Theresa May nego-
tiated and later lost her job over, and something her successor Boris 
Johnson initially supported (Belam, 2019). It meant that for the duration 
of a transition period, as they developed the technology for an invisible 
border, the UK would be beholden to the single market and customs 
union as part of a single customs territory until another arrangement 
was agreed. From the UK perspective, this solution was not sustainable 
in the long term since the supposedly temporary agreement would lock 
them into an existing structure indefinitely: unable to forge new trading 
relationships with non-EU nations. A far cry from the independent, 
global trader envisioned during the Brexit campaign (Smith, 2019). 
As a negotiating objective, both Prime Ministers agreed Brexit could 
not mean membership of the single market, yet legally leaving this 
would necessitate a border (Hayward, 2019). However, placing one in 
the Irish sea, which Boris Johnson eventually agreed to, would misalign 
Northern Ireland with the rest of the United Kingdom (Murphy, 2021). 
An arrangement that would be particularly undesirable because the 
people of Northern Ireland voted against Brexit. Something that they 
probably did because they recognized the importance of retaining a free 
trade relationship with the Republic of Ireland and how leaving could 
impede this (Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, 2017). 
Members of the UK government, including Home Secretary Priti 
Patel said and Boris Johnson said violating the unity of the UK would be 
‘unacceptable’ (Hossein-Pour, 2019). The latter said the sea trade border 
he later agreed to would be over his ‘dead body’ (McHugh, Young & 
Black, 2020). However, a range of factors, potentially including the 
democratic nostalgia of Britain as a sovereign state (Weale, 2016), the 
political cost of not securing a free trade deal and with the EU, and the 
pressure to counteract a move towards Irish unity, appeared to push 
them towards accepting a variant of this proposal. Within months of the 
Brexit deal, violence broke out in Northern Ireland. Commentators, and 
Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis, argued identity issues from 
the introduction of a border and customs checks, economically moving 
Northern Ireland away from Britain and toward Ireland, were among 
several causes (Blevins, 2021; Cameron-Chileshe & Brunsdel, 2021). A 
tragic example of both the polarizing nature of the loyalty foundation 
and the cost of ignoring it. 
2.3. Authority/subversion 
The Authority/subversion foundation has its origins in communal 
living: the pressure of forging beneficial relationships within a hunter- 
gatherer context consisting of dominance hierarchies (Haidt, 2012). 
The original triggers would include a recognition of rank, provoking 
emotions of respect and fear. Today it manifests in a concern for the 
status quo, deference to authority figures, and respecting the legitimacy 
of modern institutions (Graham et al., 2013). It is, therefore, central to a 
complex process consisting of two such institutions negotiating policy in 
their self-interest. 
This foundation appeared to be of the utmost importance to EU ne-
gotiators. Figueira and Martill (2020) argue that the UK failed to un-
derstand the EU position. They thought the UK government expected the 
unity between member states would not hold, so they would get a 
bespoke relationship to match their unique position as a member state. 
These assumptions represent a fundamental misunderstanding of EU 
values, including the indivisibility of the four freedoms mentioned 
above. A day after the 2016 referendum, the presidents of the European 
Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission made 
a statement about the “survival” of the EU, reinforcing the importance of 
common symbolic and economic values (Laffan, 2019). Patel (2018) 
suggests their negotiators were opposed to a No Deal outcome and 
wanted to manage the extent of the foreseeable damage to the EU 
economy. As Donald Tusk repeatedly stated, there could be no winners – 
only losers (Brunsden, 2016). However, their key priorities were not 
necessarily financial ones. Instead, their principal concern was to 
counter deference by preserving the integrity of the EU and ensuring the 
UK’s departure would not act as a source of inspiration for other Euro-
sceptic movements. 
Following the Brexit referendum, throughout Europe radical left and 
right parties alike defied the further transfer of budgetary/economic 
authority towards the EU (Carrieri & Vittori, 2021). Questions about 
European integration, particularly regarding existing policies, also 
received a new focus in the press (Bijsmans, 2021; Bijsmans et al., 2018). 
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Across the continent, survey data suggests most voters believe the EU 
may fall apart within 10–20 years, and over a quarter (including over 
50% of young people in some samples) think a war between member 
states is a possibility (Dennison et al., 2019). There are also individual 
countries, such as Italy, in which Eurosceptic parties have recently 
outpolled their pro-EU counterparts (Conti et al., 2020). Survey data 
shows citizens in ‘the big four’ economies (France, Germany, Italy, and 
Spain) mostly support remaining in the EU. However, they are more 
likely to support leaving if the UK economy is in a good state five years 
later (Walsh, 2020). Thus a positive outcome for Britain may have 
further encouraged representatives from other governments to renego-
tiate their membership terms and conditions. A unique arrangement 
granting favorable conditions to third countries would have therefore 
been out of the question. 
Despite negotiating as the junior partner, the UK pursued hard- 
bargaining. They took a distributive vs. problem-solving approach, 
perceiving negotiations in competitive zero-sum terms. For example, 
representatives frequently reminded ‘opponents’ they were willing to 
walk away from the table and ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’ 
(Frennhoff Larsén & Khorana, 2020). It was a dangerous adversarial 
strategy Martill and Staiger (2018) considered atypical of those in a 
position of comparative weakness. The authors argue the positioning 
reflected a belief the UK would naturally be in the driving seat. This 
outlook is consistent with Britain’s nostalgia as a superpower that 
informed the referendum result (Henderson et al., 2017; Smith, 2019). 
Many leavers understood this hard-bargaining with references to 
Britain’s past, considering the process to represent a glorious second 
revolution that would restore British liberties and self-confidence 
(Gamble, 2018). Several big speeches from Theresa May,9 Boris John-
son, and other cabinet members sold the vision of a post-Brexit Global 
Britain no longer neutered by the EU: leading the world in trade, science, 
and foreign policy, among other things (Daddow, 2019). None of which 
they argued could be achieved with a “Brexit in name only.” Chair of the 
Brexit-backing European Research Group, Jacob Rees-Mogg, likened 
Brexit to past military battles, including Waterloo and Agincourt 
(Walker, 2018). Several high-profile members of the UK government 
compared Britain leaving with the existential threat faced during World 
War 2. This list included Brexit Secretary David Davis – who suggested 
the same civil service who coped with the war could manage Brexit – and 
Mark Francois, who said his veteran father “never submitted to bullying 
by any German and neither will his son.” The comparison was also 
meaningful because the vision of an integrated Europe arose from the 
trauma of the post-war era. And the long-term goal of finding peace, 
ending the history of bloodshed from the continent’s many wars. It’s an 
integral part of the European Union still proudly shared on the organi-
zation’s website (“The history of the European Union,” n.d). 
Boris Johnson previously walked out from his appointment as 
Foreign Secretary to Theresa May after declaring that his leader was 
pursuing a “semi Brexit” which would leave the UK with “the status of a 
colony” (Buchan, 2018). This sort of rhetoric was consistent with his 
ongoing attitude towards Brexit. During the campaign, he urged people 
of the UK to adopt Winston Churchill’s defiance, likening what he saw as 
the EU’s attempts to create a European superstate to Hitler and Napo-
leon (Ross, 2016). Despite apologizing for this parallel, as both Foreign 
Secretary and Prime Minister, he continued to pepper his language with 
allusions to conflict and dominance. Including when he compared 
French President Francois Hollande10 to a Prisoners of War camp guard, 
administering “punishment beatings” in a statement likening Brexit to 
movies such as The Great Escape (Murphy & Cecil, 2017). Or when he 
suggested that May had made a “stealthy retreat” on her early promises, 
claimed he would rather “die in a ditch” than extend the Brexit deadline, 
and said legislation designed to avoid a no-deal scenario was a “sur-
render bill” (Honeyman, 2019). 
Even the motto “take back control,” repeatedly said during the 
campaign and the negotiation, is in line with democratic nostalgia, 
hinting at freedom taken from the UK (Weale, 2016). Like Donald 
Trump’s mantra “make America great again,” the allusion to better 
times from before is essential. Combined with a focus on the UK’s im-
perial past, it emotively speaks to the authority foundation by priming 
anxieties surrounding invasion, occupation, and a loss of sovereignty 
(Stratton, 2019). To view a negotiation in this way, even as posturing, 
could make reaching agreements harder and give the impression that 
changes to their negotiating stance would be a sign of weakness 
(Frennhoff Larsén & Khorana, 2020). The focus on empowering UK in-
stitutions also severely limited the flexibility of their negotiating part-
ners. By insisting the UK leaves the Single Market, the Customs Union 
and is free from the European Court of Justice jurisdiction, the UK ruled 
out the sorts of deals Norway and Switzerland had (Keating, 2021). 
Ironically, the harder-won bespoke arrangement has come with the 
types of administration and legal protocols that had once provided a 
rationale to leave. 
One specific example of Authority/subversion entering negotiating 
was fishing: an industry in which the UK and EU are symbiotic. The EU 
trade relies on the North and Irish Seas for a large share of its catch, 
while the UK’s biggest markets are in the EU. Hence Phillipson and 
Symes (2018) argued that of all the issues to be negotiated during Brexit, 
fishing would be among the most complex and contentious. The authors 
suggest that the best solutions involve cooperation: a shared vision and 
approach. As a percentage of the UK economy, the industry contributes a 
fractional amount worth just 0.02% in 2019 (Morris & Barnes, 2021). 
Yet, the symbolism of the UK claiming sovereignty over its waters 
seems to have carried a lot of weight since it was the final hurdle for 
securing a free trade deal. UK representatives, including Boris Johnson, 
may have been thinking about the symbolism of the win vs. the real- 
world considerations. Hence, he said “no sensible government” could 
agree to a deal that did not put the seas under UK control (Boffey & 
Stewart, 2020). Fishing is a point of national pride for coastal commu-
nities. Along with the quotas, there was a tangible example of a 
concession that may mean more to the public than relatively abstract 
financial arrangements: a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. 
The EU conceded, giving UK fishers a relatively higher quotient than 
before. However, they only reached this compromise after the UK 
Ministry of Defense had put gunboats on standby (Sabbagh, 2020). 
Potentially this was done for show though it was a hostile response 
nonetheless. Although if the EU’s climbdown represented a victory, as 
the UK presented it, then it was a pyrrhic one. Industry leaders and boat 
owners said new customs processes and formalities would make fishing 
sales significantly more challenging (Morris & Carroll, 2020). In a 
particularly memorable parliamentary moment, the Speaker of the 
House of Commons had to follow up Jacob Rees-Mogg’s claim that fish 
are “better and happier” being British by saying that there was no 
empirical evidence for it (Osborne, 2021). Their exchange took place 
against the backdrop of lorry loads of seafood getting destroyed. The 
Scottish Fishermen’s Federation claimed the industry was making losses 
of a million pounds per day due to new paperwork requirements 
9 Theresa May served as Prime Minister between 2016 and 2019. Biographer 
Anthony Seldon (2020) notes that she was detail oriented and cautious, but 
lacked the strategic clarity, charisma and intellectual confidence to complete 
Brexit. She later stood down, after failing to get her withdrawal agreement 
through parliament three times. 
10 Francois Hollande was French President between 2012 and 2017. An 
opponent of Brexit, he warned “there must be a threat, there must be a risk, 
there must be a price” to preserve the principles of the EU: consistent with 
concerns surrounding the Authority/subversion foundation (Chrisafis, 2016). 
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resulting in unprecedented waiting times (Johnson, 2021). The UK 
government reinforced its institutional authority, though potentially at 
the risk of its credibility and the livelihoods of people it claimed to 
empower. 
2.4. Other MFT considerations 
Although she would be the first Prime Minister to take the first stab at 
negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU, Theresa May was a Remainer. 
Albeit not an especially visible one: her rare interventions earned her the 
nickname ‘Submarine May’ from colleagues on the same side (Oliver, 
2016). However, her rationale for supporting continued membership 
was in line with her role as the then Home Secretary: security. She was 
concerned that data sharing could be compromised. The Care/harm 
foundation is tied to safety and protecting vulnerable people (Haidt, 
2012). Consequently, during of her most prominent speeches, May 
(2017) said she wanted to ensure a “comprehensive framework for 
future security, law enforcement, and criminal justice cooperation.” As 
the possibility of a no-deal outcome loomed, complications were sur-
rounding this issue. Yet, there are signs the UK is now seeking to 
strengthen international policing arrangements instead of adopting the 
insular approaches many feared they would (Jaffel & Pearson, 2021). 
For issues as sensitive as national security, pooled resources are desir-
able even to a state intent on self-governance. 
The MFT suggests the Sanctity/degradation foundation came from a 
fear of contamination. However, it has also been generalized to respond 
to corrupting ideas that can contaminate a society, i.e., an ethical im-
mune system that underlies religious values (Graham et al., 2013). Some 
researchers have drawn parallels between the marketing of Brexit before 
and the referendum with religious dogma (Kettell & Kerr, 2021), 
arguing that the Leave campaign framed leaving the EU in 
quasi-religious terminology. Similarly, others have used the idea of 
ideological purity to explain the EU’s dogmatic commitment to preser-
ving the integrity of the four freedoms (Kohler & Müller, 2017; Matthijs 
et al., 2019). It has even been labeled as “political Messianism” (Weiler, 
2012). Still, the most explicit reference to religion came from Boris 
Johnson, who told his predecessor Theresa May to invoke the spirit of 
Moses and say, “let my people go” (Johnson, 2019). A comparison that 
aligns the complicated withdrawal process from a voluntary member-
ship to the Israelites enslavement and immodestly positions himself as a 
prophet. 
3. General discussion: Brexit means Brexit 
Theresa May’s infamous tautology exposes one of the biggest chal-
lenges of leaving the European Union. In an age in which trade and 
economics have become increasingly globalized, it is not clear how 
leaving the EU would look. The present commentary explores some of 
the problems that can arise when translating idealism into concrete 
legislation. Combined with Smith (2019), it argues that the Brexit ref-
erendum, and the subsequent negotiation, were partly based upon 
relatively abstract ideas, such as freedom, fairness, and authority. These 
would need to be actualized, resulting in concrete pacts that would 
satisfy collective units driven by feelings and virtues such as group pride, 
deference for their institutions, and interpretations of justice, as 
underlined by their own cultures and historiographies (Graham et al., 
2013). These complications were exacerbated by the already strained 
relations between the two parties negotiating. 
Some may regard the free-trade deal as a failure in diplomacy. Others 
may see it as a success story or politicians making the best of difficult 
circumstances. There are pragmatic considerations that go into this kind 
of negotiation: when realpolitik necessitates a climbdown or compro-
mise. For example, it is unlikely that the UK representatives would 
voluntarily give the EU £39 billion unless they saw a benefit. Likewise, 
the economic forecasts predicting reduced economic growth in the UK, 
regardless of the deal (Tetlow & Stojanovic, 2018), perhaps encouraged 
their negotiators to compromise where they ideally would not have. A 
possibility that could be owed to the Care Foundation, and the desire to 
protect the public from harm, or the fear of an electoral backlash of not 
doing so. It is also improbable that the EU would have compromised on 
fishing as much as they did were it not the last hurdle to a deal. There are 
also many other competing interests for both sides. EU and UK leaders 
are influenced by lobby groups, stakeholders, and their populations 
(Coen & Katsaitis, 2021; James & Quaglia, 2019). The British Conser-
vative party leaders are also subject to the often contradictory demands 
of a divided party that mutually supports cosmopolitanism and 
communitarianism (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020; Shipman, 2017). 
Even within the same political party, there can be a diversity of opinions 
and moral profiles (Haidt, 2012). It was these intra-tribal issues that 
eventually pushed May to resign from her post. 
These considerations are outside the scope of this paper, which is 
looking broadly at the role of moral psychology. Yet Haidt (2012) notes 
foundations offset the importance of each other along with broader 
political concerns. In other words, while the MFT hypothesizes evolution 
has calibrated humans to respond to tribal tensions via innate ethics, 
present before experience, these are enacted upon via our environments 
and unique situations. Therefore, it is tough to know how much of the 
negotiation comes from firmly held moral positions and how much 
comes from political realities. 
There is also the possibility that some of those negotiating Brexit 
were making it up as they went along (Hanning, 2020), rather than 
abiding by a set of scripts or tactics. Without witnessing events 
first-hand, it is impossible to say how genuine the account communi-
cated through the media has been or how much of what we saw has been 
showmanship. Alan Duncan (2021), former deputy to Boris Johnson, 
dismissed him as an “embarrassing buffoon” (p227) with little under-
standing of EU laws and minimal plan. He depicts negotiations as a 
slapdash process both Theresa May and Boris Johnson went into naively. 
This interpretation is consistent with the MFT idea of emotions vs. ra-
tionality driving political decision making, leaving it open to interpre-
tation how much of the outcome was down to luck and improvisation: 
we are perhaps only seeing the tip of the iceberg through controlled 
media reports. It also, of course, unclear the extent to which we can rely 
upon the public statements of partisan actors like Duncan, who left the 
government because he disagreed with both Brexit and the way it was 
handled (Pickard & Samson, 2019). His accounts could well be accurate, 
though they could also be subject to exaggeration and distortion. 
At present, we have little insight into the individual contributions of 
each actor or how their unique personalities impacted the negotiation 
process. On the one hand, their portfolios sometimes comprise extensive 
departments, who work on their behalf, so they may be little more than 
figureheads. However, to the extent that they are personally responsible 
for setting these departments’ direction, their personality may be a 
factor. Sharma et al. (2018) show how personality traits, such as 
dominance and likeability, can predict individual negotiating perfor-
mance in field research. They suggest that these psychological di-
mensions are integral to understanding how people manage/fail to 
compromise. For instance, for the hard-bargaining style adopted by the 
UK representatives, disagreeableness may be an asset. Whereas for a 
more problem-oriented one, it may be less appropriate (Dimotakis et al., 
2012). 
Biographies and personal accounts can shed light on how the people 
in them shape negotiations. There are likely political dimensions that 
informed the roles which different people were given. Michele Barnier’s 
selection as the European Commission’s chief negotiator follows his time 
as European commissioner for financial services. During this period, he 
gained a reputation as a tough negotiator, spearheading a new approach 
to EU banking laws, including putting caps on banker bonuses and 
restricting short selling. His commitment to the vision of the EU as 27 
countries speaking in a united voice, rather than a federation, would be 
seen as a strength when a country risked subverting the consensus be-
tween member states (Watt, 2016). It also seems likely that Theresa May 
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was motivated to give Brexiteers Boris Johnson, David Davis, and Liam 
Fox prominent positions to avoid further in-party tensions. Each had 
credibility with the party’s right wing, and by putting them in charge of 
the discussions, they would have ownership of the results (Seldon, 
2020). 
Beyond practical considerations, each appointment should have an 
appropriate person-job fit (Kristof-Brown & Guay, 2011). For example, 
May placing Davis in charge of the newly established Department for 
Exiting the European Union could have also been because his uncom-
promising bluster and bravado were consistent with the hard-bargaining 
tactics (Shipman, 2017). Likewise, Labour MP KevinBrannan (2016) 
dismissed Boris Johnson heading the foreign office as “the most 
remarkable appointment since the Emperor Caligula appointed his horse 
a senator” (Brennan, 2016). But May’s advisor Nick Timothy recalls her 
praising her “gobsmacked” former leadership rival for his robust intel-
lect and political effectiveness (Seldon, 2020, p. 74). In addition to his 
popularity within the party, she appears to have considered his bois-
terous personality and salesmanship vs. statesmanship as an asset 
(Stewart, 2016). 
Insights into the psychological profiles of the people in charge of the 
negotiations can help us to understand how they got the roles they did 
and how they operated when in them. Candidates for consideration 
include The Big Five: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (John & Srivastava, 1999). These traits 
correspond to individual political ideologies and participation (Gerber 
et al., 2011) e.g., Openness being associated with liberl attitudes and 
Conscentiousness being associated with conservative attitudes. Regional 
differences in the Big Five also predict people’s attitudes towards Brexit 
(Garretsen et al., 2018) By extension, they may also indicate how those 
responsible for negotiating fulfilled their roles. Similarly, oppositional 
attitudes towards supranationalism are an even more reliable predictor 
of attitudes towards Brexit than other established factors such as na-
tional identity and the extent to which people perceive immigration as a 
threat (Peitz et al., 2018). 
The final deal allowed both sides to present it as a win: the UK had 
protected its national sovereignty. The EU had retained a free-trade 
agreement with the UK without forfeiting its unity or integrity. At the 
moment, the signs point towards Brexit, confining the UK’s economic 
ambitions for at least the short term. Overall exports to the EU, still their 
largest trading partner, dropped by over 40% in the month following 
Brexit (Casey, 2021). However, a part of this may also be due to 
heightened security during the Covid-19 pandemic. There also exists the 
possibility of the UK making up the shortfall with the other international 
trade deals presently negotiated (“UK trade agreements with non-EU 
countries,” n.d). 
What is certain is that the implications of this process will go on for 
some time yet. Not least because of how divergent Brexit preferences 
throughout the UK’s four nations raises many constitutional and polit-
ical problems, including a reinvigorated push for Scottish independence 
fueled by the possibility of re-entry (McEwen & Murphy, 2021). Brexit is 
a process rather than an event, and the ongoing affiliation between the 
UK and the EU will undoubtedly be subject to geopolitical de-
velopments. Successive UK governments will inevitably wish to rene-
gotiate, or alter, aspects of their relationship with the EU. Hence this 
story, which potentially reflects priorities as old as humanity, is far from 
over. 
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